Traditionally, (nonmasking and masking) fault-tolerance has focused on ensuring that after the occurrence of faults, the program recovers to states from where it continues to satisfy its original specification. However, a problem with this limited notion is that, in some cases, it may be impossible to recover to states from where the entire original specification is satisfied. For this reason, one can consider a fault-tolerant graceful-degradation program that ensures that upon the occurrence of faults, the program recovers to states from where a (given) subset of its specification is satisfied. Typically, the subset of specification satisfied thus would be the critical/important requirements. In this paper, we initially focus on automatically revising a given fault-intolerant program into a fault-tolerant gracefully degrading program. Specifically, we propose a two-step approach: In the first step, we transform the fault-intolerant program into a graceful program. This program is guaranteed to satisfy only the given subset of specification (e.g., critical requirements). In particular, this step involves adding new behaviors that will satisfy the given subset of the specification. The second step involves utilizing the original program and the graceful program to obtain a fault-tolerant gracefully degrading program. We also develop an algorithm to transform the gracefully degrading program into a distributed gracefully degrading program. Afterwards, the second phase of our transformation can be applied to generate a distributed fault-tolerant gracefully degrading program. We showcase the algorithm with three different non-trivial case studies. Finally, we formalize the problem of multi-graceful degradation and propose an algorithm that solves it and we use a complex case study to showcase the viability of the approach. All the algorithms have polynomial time complexity in the size of the state space of the original program.
Introduction
We are increasingly dependent on highly available computer systems to provide fully functional and stable services. However, these programs are often subjected to new types of faults that are not considered in the original design. This may occur, for example, due to changing user requirements or due to deployment of the program in a new environment. It is especially important that the addition of such fault-tolerance be done correctly, i.e., the addition indeed provides the required resilience and preserves the original functionality.
Some of the existing approaches for automated addition of fault-tolerance include [1] [2] [3] , where three different levels of fault-tolerance, namely nonmasking, masking and stabilizing, are considered. The common requirement for these levels of tolerance can be succinctly described with Fig. 1a , where S denotes the states where the program operates in the absence of faults and T denotes the states where the program may operate in the presence of faults. Faulttolerance requires that if the program is perturbed to a state in T then it recovers to a state in S so that the subsequent behavior satisfies the program specification. (Masking faulttolerance has an additional requirement that recovery from T to S must be safe whereas stabilizing fault-tolerance has an additional requirement that T must include all possible states.)
However, one limitation of these approaches is that in many scenarios, it is impossible for the program to recover to the original program behavior after faults occur, i.e., it may be impossible for the program to recover to states in S. In such scenarios, it is desirable that the program recovers to an acceptable state (cf. S in Fig. 1b ) from where it satis- fies some gracefully degraded behavior, i.e., behavior that is close to its original behavior. The goal of this work is to develop algorithms where we begin with a program that satisfies its specification in the absence of faults (while being in states in S) and the desired relaxed specification in the presence of faults. The goal of the algorithm is to first identify a suitable S and then construct a fault-tolerant program that (1) preserves the specification in the absence of faults and (2) recovers to states in S after the occurrence of faults from where it satisfies the given relaxed specification.
To illustrate this goal further, consider a canonical example of a graceful behavior program where the original program provides core services and auxiliary services. However, after recovery, the program guarantees core services. In this context, the goal of the algorithm would be to begin with a program that satisfies the original specification in the absence of faults and desired requirements in the presence of faults (critical requirements) and construct a program that will (1) satisfy both critical and auxiliary requirements in the absence of faults and (2) provide recovery to states where it satisfies critical requirements.
The idea of such graceful degradation has been introduced in [4] , where authors consider the specification to consist of a set of n properties. Subsequently, they consider desirable subsets (which are typically much less than 2 n subsets) of these n properties. To further illustrate the application of graceful degradation, we use the printer example considered in [4] . A printer system consists of computers sending printing tasks to a collection of printers. The tasks are organized in a queue and each printer executes a transaction in which it dequeues only one task and then prints it. In an ideal scenario (S in Fig.  1 ) , one may prefer FIFO order for print requests, i.e., the task that is dequeued first is printed first. Thus, in an ideal setting, the specification requires that at most one dequeue operation can occur at a time. And, the next dequeue operation occurs only after the current task is printed.
For the sake of discussion, assume that in the presence of faults such as network delays or computer crashes, it may not be possible to guarantee that the program can recover to states from where this specification would be satisfied. Hence, one possible weaker specification (considered in [4] ) is to allow a limited out-of-order printing. For example, one simple specification is that Task n is printed only after Task n − 2 is printed although Task n may be printed before Task n − 1.
In this example, the original program provides FIFO order for print requests. The desired fault-tolerant graceful degradation program has the following properties. In the absence of faults (states S in Fig. 1 ), the program provides FIFO ordering. However, if faults occur then the program recovers to states (S in Fig. 1 ) from where it satisfies the degraded (weaker) specification (i.e., limited out-of-order printing).
One of the difficulties in generating the fault-tolerant program that provides graceful degradation lies in the fact that the input does not contain a program that satisfies the weaker specification (i.e., a program that satisfies out-of-order printing). Asking the designer to specify such a program is undesirable, since it increases the overhead for the designer. With this motivation, our approach for adding fault-tolerant graceful-degradation consists of two steps. The first step ( Fig. 2) focuses on the automated addition of graceful degradation to the fault-intolerant program in the absence of faults.
In particular, this step begins with a program, say p, that satisfies the original specification (FIFO order for the printer example) and constructs a program, say p g , that satisfies the weaker, degraded specification (limited out-of-order printing). The program p g is obtained by adding new behaviors to p, outside of S but within S (e.g., to provide out-of-order printing in the printer example). Thus, in the case of the printer example, the generated program will provide FIFO behavior from the original states as well as limited out-oforder printing from additional states.
In the second step ( Fig. 3 ), we begin with program p and p g to construct a fault-tolerant gracefully degrading 3 Step 2: Design of fault-tolerant graceful degradation program p f . Program p f ensures that in the absence of faults, it behaves like p and, hence, it will satisfy the original specification in the absence of faults. Moreover, if faults occur then p f recovers to states from where p g satisfies the degraded specification. Depending upon what p f does during the recovery process, we can get different variations. For example, one variation can be similar to masking faulttolerance where some safety properties are satisfied during the recovery process. Another variation can be similar to stabilizing fault-tolerance where recovery must be provided from an arbitrary state. 1 Subsequently, we extend the problem of fault-tolerant graceful degradation to address the problem of fault-tolerant multi-graceful degradation. Intuitively, fault-tolerant multigraceful degradation allows a hierarchy of severe faults and require that the program satisfy corresponding hierarchy of weaker specifications. After formalizing the problem of addition of fault-tolerant multi-graceful degradation to a program, we provide an algorithm, based on the two-step approach, that solves the problem. We illustrate the working of the algorithm through a detailed case study associated with Ohio Coal Research Center (OCRC). 1 Note that these variations are not the same as masking and/or stabilizing tolerance since p f may not satisfy its original specification after recovery is complete. Moreover, if we utilize existing algorithms [5] where the input consists of program p then those algorithms will declare failure to add masking fault-tolerance if it is impossible to guarantee recovery to behaviors of program p.
Contributions of the paper The contributions of the paper are as follows:
-We define the problem of automated addition of graceful degradation and present a polynomial-time algorithm in the size of the state space of the fault-intolerant program to solve it. Unlike previous algorithms [5] that focus on removing behaviors in the absence of faults, this algorithm focuses on adding new behaviors while ensuring that these behaviors still satisfy the weaker specification. -We provide an algorithm that transforms a graceful program into a distributed graceful program. -We adapt existing algorithms for adding fault-tolerance to design fault-tolerant graceful degradation. -We illustrate our algorithm with three case studies, namely (i) the printer system, (ii) resource constraint problem motivated by channel assignment in cellular networks and (iii) the classic byzantine agreement problem. -We extend the problem of adding graceful fault-tolerance to the case where we have a hierarchy of increasingly severe faults and we need to satisfy decreasing level of specification in their presence. For this purpose, we define the problem of automated addition of fault-tolerant multi-graceful degradation and present a polynomialtime algorithm, based on the two-step approach, with complexity in the size of the state space of the faultintolerant program to solve it. -We illustrate the multi-graceful degradation addition algorithm through a detailed case study of the Ohio Coal Research Center (OCRC) [6] .
Organization of paper The rest of paper is organized as follows: We define the notion of program, specification and specification relaxation in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we formally state the problem of automated generation of the graceful program. In Sect. 4, we present the algorithm to generate the graceful program from the original program and the specification (original and relaxed). In Sect. 5, we present two case studies to demonstrate the graceful program generation step by step. In Sect. 6, we discuss how to extend the algorithm for generating graceful programs to distributed programs. In Sect. 7, we use byzantine agreement as an example to further illustrate the technique of generating graceful distributed programs. In Sect. 8, we define the problem of adding faulttolerant graceful degradation and continue with the three case studies to add fault-tolerance to the programs generated in Sects. 5 and 7. We then present and formalize the problem of automated addition of multi-graceful degradation in Sect. 9 and present a polynomial-time algorithm that solves it. To show the working of the multi-graceful degradation addition algorithm, we present the OCRC system in detail in Sect. 10, present a model of the system and then show the application of the multi-graceful degradation algorithm to the OCRC sys-tem. Finally, we discuss related work in Sect. 11 and provide further insights and a summarize the paper in Sect. 12, where we also provide insights of our ongoing work.
Preliminary
In this section, we give formal definitions of programs, program specifications, and graceful degradation. The program is specified in terms of its state space and transitions. The definition of specification is adapted from [7] . The notion of graceful degradation is adapted from [4] . 
Program
) iff (∀(s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ δ p : (s 0 ∈ S ⇒ s 1 ∈ S)). A sequence of states, s 0 , s 1 , · · · (denoted by σ ), is a computation of p iff(1) ∀ j : 0 < j < length(σ ) : (s j−1 , s j ) ∈ δ p ,
Program syntax
To model the state space and transitions concisely, we use processes, variables (associated with a finite domain) and actions. The state space S p of p is obtained by assigning each variable a value from its respective domain. Thus, the use of variables allows us to represent the state space compactly. Additionally, to compactly represent δ p , we use actions of the form: guard −→ statement where guard is a constraint (predicate) involving program variables and statement updates program variables [8] . We denote variable x of a process j by x. j. An action guard −→ statement denotes the set of transitions {(s 0 , s 1 ) : guard is true in s 0 and s 1 is obtained by changing s 0 as prescribed by statement}. We use x(s) to denote the value of variable x in state s. This compact representation has been used in several past works to represent distributed algorithms, e.g., [8] .
As an example, consider a triple modular redundancy (TMR) system, with three inputs x, y and z to the voter and an output out from the voter. One action of the TMR system is as follows:
This action basically states that when all three inputs are the same, the voter chooses one of them as output. To further illustrate that an action provides a concise representation of transitions, consider the domain of x, y and z to be {0, 1} and out is defined over {0, 1, ⊥}, where ⊥ denotes an undefined value. The state space of the TMR program will contain 24 states. The above action will represent the following set of transitions:
Specification
Following Alpern and Schneider [7] , we let the specification of program consist of a safety specification and a liveness specification. The safety specification is specified in terms of a set of bad states, say spec bs , that program is not allowed to reach, and a set of bad transitions, spec bt , that the program is not allowed to execute. Thus, a sequence s 0 , s 1 , · · · (denoted by σ ) satisfies the safety specification iff (1) ∀ j : 0 ≤ j < length(σ ) : s j / ∈ spec bs , and (2)
∈ spec bt . The liveness specification, on the other hand, denotes "good thing" happens during program execution. We use leadsto property (L T ) to denote liveness specification, where both L and T are state predicates. Thus, a sequence
A specification, say spec, is a tuple S f p , Lv p , where S f p is a safety specification and Lv p is a liveness specification. A sequence σ satisfies spec iff it satisfies S f p and Lv p . Hence, for brevity, we say that the program specification is an intersection of a safety specification and a liveness specification.
Given a program p, a state predicate S, and specification spec, we say S is an invariant of p iff (1) S is closed in p; (2) Every computation of p that starts in a state, say s, where s ∈ S satisfies spec; and (3) S = ∅.
Graceful degradation
In graceful degradation, it is expected that the program will satisfy a stronger specification under normal circumstances. And, it will satisfy a weaker specification under some other circumstances (e.g., in the presence of faults). Let spec = S f , Lv and spec r = S f r , Lv r be two specifications. We say that spec r is weaker than spec iff for any sequence σ if σ satisfies spec then σ satisfies spec r .
Problem statement for graceful degradation design
In this section, we formally define the problem of generating a program that satisfies the weaker specification (cf. Fig.  2 ). We begin with a program p that satisfies the specification spec from invariant I . We derive a graceful degrading program, say p g , and its invariant I g such that p g satisfies a weaker specification, say spec r from I g . Next, we consider the relation between p and p g as well as I and I g to identify the problem statement. One requirement on p g is that p g is supposed to add new behaviors that potentially violate spec while satisfying spec r . And, it is not allowed to remove any behaviors of p that satisfy spec. Since the correctness of p is known from its invariant I , based on this requirement, it follows that I should be a subset of I g . Additionally, p g cannot remove any behaviors (respectively, transitions) within the original invariant I . Thus, the problem statement is shown as follows:
Problem Statement III.1 : Given p, I , spec and spec r such that p satisfies spec from I . Identify p g and I g such that: A1: p g |I = p|I , I ⊆ I g , A2: p g satisfies spec r from I g , A3: p g |I satisfies spec from I .
Remark
The above problem statement has a requirement that I be a subset of I g . This requirement differs from [5] in that this enlarges the invariant by adding new states from where the new specification can be satisfied. By contrast, in [5] , the problem statement requires that the generated invariant be a subset of the original invariant. For this reason, existing algorithms cannot be used to solve the above problem.
Algorithm for generating graceful program
We begin with the given program p, its invariant I and its two specifications (stronger) spec and (weaker) spec r . In turn, spec and spec r are specified in terms of the corresponding safety and liveness specification. Our goal is to construct p g and I g such that they satisfy constraints of Problem III.1. Algorithm 1 also takes an additional input which is a state predicate, namely S a . The intuition for S a arises from the fact that the program is expected to satisfy the specification spec r under certain constraints. Predicate S a is used to characterize these constraints. If such constraints are not easily identifiable, S a can be instantiated to be S p − I , i.e., all states except those in I .
First, Algorithm 1 computes I to be the set of states in S a except those that violate safety (i.e., those in spec r bs ). The first guess for I g , the invariant for the graceful program, is then set to I ∪ I (Line 2). Then, Algorithm 1 computes the first guess for p g . Specifically, in p g , we reuse all the transitions in p that begin in I . We also include all transitions that begin in I unless they violate safety spec r bt (Line 3). Starting from Line 4, the algorithm revises the program by ensuring the liveness specification is satisfied. In Lines 6-9, we exclude the deadlock states, i.e., states from where no transitions originates from I g . Then we recompute p g such that all the reachable states by p g starting from I (or I ) remains in I (or I respectively). To ensure liveness, we define a function rank that assigns each state an integer value that represents the length of the shortest path from that state to reach a target state predicate T . Then, on Lines 11 and 12, we exclude states and transitions where rank does not decrease. Removal of such transitions ensures that there will be no cycles that prevent the program from reaching T . To resolve deadlock states, we repeat the loop starting at Line 4. Finally, this process stops once a fixpoint is reached.
We now prove the correctness of Algorithm 1. until I old = I 11: 
Proof
We proceed by proving each case. 
implies that p | I = p | I . On Line 8, computation of maxp does not result in any state or transition in the invariant being removed. Hence, the predicate p | I = p | I holds. On Line 11, the set of transitions that are removed are not in I . Hence, the condition holds through out. 3) p | I satisfies spec from I: Since p satisfies spec from I and none of the transitions that begin in I are removed, then p |I = p|I . Hence, p satisfies spec from I . Proof It follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Graceful degradation design: case studies
In this section, we demonstrate the process of generating the gracefully degrading programs through two case studies, namely (1) a printer system and (2) a resource constraint problem motivated by cellular networks. In each case study, we first define the program with its specification (including the original and the graceful specification). Then, we simulate the algorithm on each case study. Subsequently in Sect. 8, we revisit them in the context of adding faulttolerance.
Printer system
In the first case study, we focus on the printer system considered in [4] . In the original specification, the printer system is required to satisfy the F I F O specification. However, as argued in [4] , it may be necessary to relax this requirement under certain constraints. In particular, the weaker requirement considered in [4] requires that some out-of-order printing is permitted.
Original program. The program in [4] consists of several clients and print servers. Using the transaction semantics, the clients 'enqueue' their print requests in a central queue. A print server then removes a task from this non-empty queue and prints the task. Please observe that the queue is of bounded length as we assume finite state programs. For simplicity, we do not model the transactions used for concurrency control and the enqueue operation since it does not affect the behavior we are interested in. The original program, say pr intolerant , consists of two parts (1) once ith task has been dequeued (d i = 1) and it has not been printed ( p i = 0), then print it ( p i :=1) and (2) if the ith task has been printed ( p i = 1), then the next Task (i + 1) in queue gets a chance to be dequeued (d i+1 :=1). Thus actions are as follows:
For sake of simplicity, in this paper, we consider the case where the number of jobs is enumerated explicitly. To make this more generic, one can utilize approaches for parametric synthesis where the number of jobs is left as a parameter. Examples of such parametric approaches are discussed in [9, 10] .
Safety specification. Recall that the safety specification is in terms of a set of bad states that the program should not reach and a set of bad transitions that the program should not execute. The first specification S f bs_1 is satisfied by the original program and requires that the printing must occur in order and, hence, Task j cannot be dequeued until Task j − 1 is printed. The graceful specification permits the possibility that Task j can be dequeued even if Task j − 1 is not printed. However, it requires that Task j cannot be dequeued until Task j − 2 is printed. Thus, the safety specification (original and graceful) that identifies the states that should not be reached is specified as follows:
Observe that S f bs_1 is the stronger specification capturing the notion of FIFO, and S f bs_2 is a weaker specification since it allows at most two tasks be dequeued without finishing the pending printing. One could consider further relaxation that allows more out-of-order printing. Our algorithm can be applied in this context by applying Algorithm 1 to the program described at the end of this section. However, the detailed analysis of this generation is outside the scope of this paper.
In addition to bad states, safety specification can include bad transitions that the program is not allowed to execute. The bad transitions, S f bt_c , describe structural constraints that have to be satisfied by the printer system. In particular, S f bt_c states that a printed task cannot be reset to unprinted. Likewise, once the task has been dequeued it cannot be reenqueued. And, a task cannot be printed until it is dequeued. Note that the structural constraints have to be satisfied in the original as well as the graceful program. Also, at most one variable can be changed in any transition. Thus,
We use safety specification for original program as S f bs_1 and S f bt_c ; for graceful program as S f bs_2 and S f bt_c . Note that although the set of bad transitions are the same here, it is not a requirement for Algorithm 1.
Liveness specification. The liveness specification requires that eventually all tasks are printed. Thus,
Application of Algorithm 1. We instantiate Algorithm 1 with following inputs: -program p: is instantiated to be transitions corresponding to program pr intolerant . For simplicity, we assume that there are three tasks in the system. Hence, the state of the program is represented as
, where d i (respectively, p i ) denotes whether Task i has been dequeued (respectively printed).
-The safety specification is instantiated so that the set of bad states is S f bs_2 and the set of bad transitions is S f bt_c . -Liveness specification is specified to be Lv. -Invariant I is instantiated to be the states reached in the computation of pr intolerant by starting from the initial state (000, 000). -State predicate S a is instantiated to be S p − I Consider the candidate states generated outside I from Line 1 that also exclude those violate S f bs_2 . Recall that S f bs_2 allows two tasks to be dequeued at once and allows one task to be printed before the previous task is completed. The new program transitions generated are all possible pairs of states in I plus those that provide recovery from I to I provided that they do not violate S f bt_c . There are no deadlock states on Line 8. Moreover, since every state in I or I has a path to a state where all tasks are completed, no state and transition are removed on Lines 11 and 12. Now, we evaluate the new behavior of the printer system in p g provided in Fig. 4 . Ideally, the program stays in invariant I while satisfying S f bs_1 , S f bt_c and Lv. However, if the program is perturbed to be outside I then it will satisfy S f bs_2 , S f bt_c and Lv. Figure 4 shows the behavior of the graceful program. Note that in this program, the tasks being printed are not totally out of order, though it is not FIFO. For example, Task 3 can be printed before Task 2 but Task 3 cannot be printed before Task 1.
Resource constraint problem: channel assignment
In this section, we model the problem of resource constraints in a wireless cellular network [11] . When a call is made, a number of channels are assigned to it. However, due to the finite number of channels available, these have to be shared among a finite number of calls, and call degradation can be incorporated to maximize the revenue by maximizing the number of admitted calls. For brevity, we consider a simplified version of this problem and describe how Algorithm 1 can be applied to generate a graceful program.
In such a network, each cell is associated with a set of frequencies. Each frequency can be used by a single call. However, to improve quality of the call, one call may be assigned several frequencies. Clearly, if a call is assigned 0 channels/frequencies then the call cannot be completed and the call fails. As the number of assigned channels increases the call quality improves. There is a minimum number of channels (M I N ) that must be allocated to a call so that the call quality is at an acceptable level. Also, there is a maximum number of channels (M AX) that should be allocated, as allocating subsequent channels does not lead to improvement in call quality.
From a user perspective, to keep user satisfaction at higher levels, it is desirable to assign as many channels as possible to every call, up to M AX channels. And, from a system perspective, it is desirable to assign as few channels as possible so that the probability of a call failure (where the call is dropped due to unavailable channels) is kept very low. To simplify the modeling of this system, we consider the case where the maximum channels allocated to a call is 3 (M AX = 3) and the minimum number of channels allocated is 2 (M I N = 2).
Normally, each call in such a system is defined by the following parameters: -Channel requirements: Each call defines its preferred (or maximum) number of channels. -Priority: This determines the class/type of the call. -Degradation tolerance: The (maximum) number of channels that can be reclaimed from the call. -Admission policy: If a cell becomes saturated, it can either reject an incoming call or degrade ongoing calls to accommodate new calls. -Revenue: Each admitted call generates a revenue based on the agreed QoS (i.e., number of channels).
For the purpose of keeping the case study simple, we consider all calls to be of the same priority and all calls have a degradation tolerance of 1 (M AX − M I N ). For the admission policy, we consider call degradation (for gracefully degrading calls). We do not model revenue as such, but try to maximize the number of admitted calls. Furthermore, we also assume that there is a finite number of channels and calls and that calls are of infinite duration, i.e., reclamation of channels is omitted for simplicity. We note that these assumptions are only for simplicity and Algorithm 1 can be easily applied in cases where these assumptions are omitted.
Original program The system begins with a given number (M AXC) of available channels. A call is admitted to the system only if it can be allocated M AX (3) channels. Otherwise, the call fails. To model such a program, for each call, we maintain a variable c i that denotes whether call i is current (i.e., admitted) and variable a i that denotes the number of channels allocated to call i. Instead, we assume that actions for allocating channels to call i are executed only when call i is requesting them. We also use variable av to denote the number of available channels. This variable is initialized to M AXC in the initial state.
Original safety property
The original safety specification requires that each admitted call is either allocated three channels or no channel. It also requires that the total number of allocated and unallocated channels equal to M AXC. Thus, the safety specification of the original program is:
where n is the number of admitted calls.
Also, since we are not modeling release of channels, we say that the following transitions -where we start in a state where a call has been assigned some channels and end up in a state where the call has been assigned less channels -also violate safety.
S f bt_c
:=(∃i::c i = 1 ∧ c i = 0) ∨ (av > av)
Original liveness specification
The liveness specification requires that all calls are serviced when channels are available. Thus, the liveness specification is as follows
Relaxed safety property Observe that the original program requires that each active call is assigned three channels. Based on the earlier discussion, the relaxed program is permitted to assign two channels to a call or 1 channel can be reclaimed from ongoing calls. However, since the goal of the channel assignment program is to assign two channels only if required, we capture this with the following relaxed safety property. Intuitively, this relaxed safety property requires that if some call is assigned two channels, it is due to the fact that it could not be assigned the three possible channels. Hence, the states that should not be reached in the graceful program are S f bs_2 :=(∃i::
We instantiate Algorithm 1 with the following inputs:
-The set of program transitions is instantiated with those associated with the original program, denoted by P c in subsequent description. For illustration, we assume that the total available channels is M AXC = 7. We represent the state of P c as (av, c 1 c 2 c 3 · · · c n , a 1 a 2 a 3 · · · a n ), where c i denotes whether call i is admitted, a i denotes the number of channels allocated to call i and av denotes the number of remaining channels. For illustration purpose, we consider the case where the number of calls is 3, i.e., n = 3. -The invariant I is instantiated to be states reached from the initial state where all (7) channels are available and no channel is allocated to any call. Thus, I is the set of states reached from the state (7, 000, 000) in the original program. -The state predicate S a , is instantiated to be S P c − I (set of states of P c except the states in the invariant). -We instantiate the safety specification with S f bs_2 , the set of bad states for the graceful program, and S f bt_c , the set of bad transitions. -The liveness specification is instantiated with Lv.
Since the relaxed safety specification requires that a call is assigned two channels only if no free channels are available, the only states in S a from where two channels are allocated to a process are those where the number of free channels is either 0, 1 or 2. Moreover, since the sum of the assigned and free channels is equal to M AXC, any action added to the relaxed program can only redistribute channels among processes. Hence, the relaxed program includes the following three actions that correspond to the case where the number of available channels is either 0, 1 or 2. It also includes actions where we only switch between channels assigned to a single call. Thus, the actions are as follows:
where i j and k are quantified over the number of calls in the system. We can also visualize the above actions as shown in Fig. 5 .
Algorithm for generating distributed graceful programs
In this section, we extend Algorithm 1 (see Sect. 4) to handle distributed programs. In particular, Algorithm 1 focuses on deriving a concurrent graceful program, where the program is able to read and update all variables in an atomic step. In applying Algorithm 1 to distributed programs, it is necessary that the generated program can be implemented using a set of processes.
The main difference between a concurrent program and a distributed program is that, in a distributed program, each process may have some private variables to which they have sole access. Use of such variables is essential in ensuring that the graceful program is implementable in a distributed system. As an illustration, if we model processes that may be byzantine, then the knowledge of whether a process is byzantine must necessarily be private to that process.
There are several ways to model such distributed programs. One approach is to utilize message passing, where all process information is private. And, channels are introduced between processes so that they can send information to other processes. We can observe that in such a system, a channel is a shared object that is accessed by the processes on both ends of it. To manage complexity, however, it is desirable to utilize models that hide such detailed implementation. One such approach is to use shared memory model. In shared memory model, each process can read the (public) variables of its neighbors (in a pre-defined neighbor list) and update its own information. Modeling distributed programs To capture shared memory programs, we use the approach in [12] . Specifically, we introduce w i as a set of variables that process i can write and r i as a set of variables process that i can read. We model these restrictions as follows: Write restriction Given a transition (s 0 , s 1 ), we can trivially identify variables written in this transition. In particular, if value of a variable in s 0 differs from that in s 1 then that variable has been written by the transition. Hence, we can model write restriction by preventing process i from utilizing transitions that write variables are outside w i . Thus, a write restriction prevents a process from utilizing transitions:
To model write restrictions, we can simply add the above transitions to the transitions that violate safety as far as process i is concerned. If a transition cannot be executed by any process then we can simply add it to transitions that violate safety (while specifying input for Algorithm 1). 
Read restriction
We handle the distribution issues during Algorithm 1 as follows. Write restrictions are added to safety violating transitions and, hence, would be removed. Read restrictions are ignored initially, i.e., in the loop 4-13. However, just before we check the condition on Line 13 that determines whether the loop should terminate, we attempt to remove the corresponding group of transitions removed in the loop. However, if removal of some transition, say t 1 , causes removal of transition t2 and t2 is a transition in I × I then we only remove t1 but not the corresponding group. This is due to the fact that Problem III.1 prevents us from removing transitions in I × I . It is therefore possible that the transitions of the graceful program may not satisfy the read restrictions entirely. Based on this discussion, we present the following algorithm snippet (Algorithm 2) that is inserted between Line 12 and Line 13 in Algorithm 1 to handle read restrictions. Proof All the transitions that have been removed in one pass through the iteration are collected and the respective read restriction group, for each process, is removed. This group does not contain any transition τ ∈ I × I . Thus, problem III.1 (A1) is satisfied. Since all deadlock states in I are removed, and maxp returns the largest program, problem III.1 (A2) is satisfied. Finally, problem III.1 (A3) is satisfied as no transition in I is removed and that p satisfies spec from I .
Case study for graceful distributed programs
In this section, we present the case study for byzantine agreement problem. In the canonical version of byzantine agreement, there is a general process and three non-general processes. In an ideal scenario, the general sends a decision (either 0 or 1) to non-generals. The non-generals receive this decision and finalize their decision to be that of the general. This ensures strong validity, i.e., the decision of the non-generals is the same as that of the general and strong agreement, i.e., the decision of the non-generals match with each other. One can consider some graceful versions of this. One graceful version allows a non-general to be byzantine and, hence, allows it to change its decision. For this graceful version, the program satisfies weak validity, i.e., the decision of the non-byzantine non-general is the same as that of the general provided the non-general is non-byzantine and weak agreement, the decision of the non-general is the same as that of another non-general provided both are not byzantine. 2 The program for the ideal scenario suffices to deal with ensuring weak validity and weak agreement if a non-general is byzantine.
In this case study, we begin with this program as our input program for which we want to add graceful degradation. 3 Subsequently, we derive a graceful version of this program that only satisfies weak agreement. Finally, we utilize this derived graceful program along with the original program to derive a fault-tolerant graceful degradation byzantine agreement program, i.e., a program that (1) satisfies weak validity and weak agreement in the absence of faults and (2) satisfies weak agreement in the presence of faults, where the fault makes the general process byzantine.
Original program

State space
The
, the decision value can be ⊥, 0 or 1. The value ⊥ denotes that the corresponding non-general process has not received the decision from general. Each non-general also maintains a variable f that is 0 initially and is set to 1 when it finalizes its decision. Also, the variable b maintained in each process denotes whether the process is byzantine (b = 1) or not (b = 0). Thus, the variables are defined as follows.
Specification of byzantine agreement
As described above, the original safety specification is weak validity and weak agreement. Weak validity requires non-byzantine non-generals to finalize their decision to be the same as that of the general. Weak agreement requires that the final decision of any two non-byzantine non-generals should be the same. Additionally, the notion of finalization Footnote 2 continued requirement generally considered in the literature is slightly different from weak validity considered here. Specifically, weak validity requires the non-general to be non-byzantine. But does not impose the same requirement on the general. This is due to the fact that weak validity is expected to be satisfied in the absence of faults (that make the general byzantine) and only weak agreement is expected to be satisfied in the presence of faults.
requires that a non-general cannot finalize the decision ⊥ and it cannot change it after it finalizes it. Thus, the set of bad states or transitions identified by these specifications are as follows:
The original safety specification, spec, is specified in terms of the set of bad states, (spec bs_va ∪ spec bs_ag ∪ spec bs_nb ), and the set of bad transitions spec bt_ f i .
Finally, the liveness specification, Lv requires (for both original and graceful program) that each non-byzantine nongeneral finalizes its decision. This is specified as follows:
Actions for original program
As discussed above, the original program deals with the case where a non-general is byzantine but not the case where a general is byzantine. The actions of the original program are as follows:
The last action is the one that allows a byzantine nongeneral to change its decision. Since Problem Statement III.1 guarantees to preserve existing behavior, these actions would be preserved in the final program. These actions are treated as environment actions, i.e., actions that eventually stop. Hence, they are not considered in resolving liveness on Lines 11 and 12.
Invariant of original program
The invariant can be computed from the initial state where the general is not byzantine and at most one non-general may be byzantine. Moreover, the decision of each non-general is ⊥ and it has not finalized its decision. The states reached from this initial state by the computation of the above program are as follows:
Graceful program The graceful program is intended for the scenarios where the general is byzantine. Hence, the weaker specification spec r is specified in terms of the set of bad states, (spec bs_ag ∪ spec bs_nb ), and the set of bad transitions spec bt_ f i .
We now illustrate Algorithm 1 in the context of byzantine agreement. In particular, we instantiate Algorithm 1 with (1) p, the transitions of the original program, (2) spec and spec r representing the original and weaker specification, (3) liveness specification Lv, (4) invariant I , and (5) state predicate S a equal to b.g ∧ ¬b.i ∧ ¬b. j ∧ ¬b.k. Note that the last parameter is based on the observation that the graceful program is intended for scenarios where the general is byzantine. Now, we evaluate Algorithm 1 on these inputs. Hence, after computation by Line 1, we have
Line 3: Identifying a set of transitions ( p ) not violating safety specification. After enumerating the possible states in I generated on Line 1, the algorithm generates p by reusing p as well as including any transition in space I × I that does not violate the specification spec r . If following Algorithm 1 as is, it would include transitions where process j changes the value of d.k. Or, it may include transitions of process j that rely on the general being non-byzantine. Since this would be unacceptable in the fault-tolerant graceful degradation program, as it would be impossible to implement such a program, we utilize the approach discussed in Sect. 6 to model ability of different processes to read and write variables.
Loop 4-13: Resolving deadlock states and liveness violation.
It is straightforward to observe that in this case, the following transitions can be included in p : (1) A process that has not finalized can change its decision to 0 or 1 nondeterministically, or (2) A process can finalize as long as its decision is not ⊥ and another process has not finalized with a different decision.
Notation. We use the sequence x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 to denote the set of states where the value of x 1 equals d.g, the value of x 2 equals d.i, the value of x 3 equals d. j and the value of x 4 equals d.k. We use ' * ' to denote that the decision value of certain process is irrelevant. For example * , 1, 1, 1 denotes the set of states where
In such a program, there are no deadlock states. However, some transitions need to be removed due to non-decreasing rank value (Line 11). In particular, consider a state in * , 0, 0, 1 where process k has not finalized its decision. Further consider the transition where process i changes its decision to 1. This transition is removed since the rank of both states (number of steps to reach a state where all nonbyzantine non-generals have finalized) is the same. In other words, a process in majority cannot change its decision to the minority process unless that minority process has finalized its decision.
At this point, we reach the end of the loop (Line 13). Since we need to consider grouping caused by read restrictions, this results in removal of all transitions where a process in majority changes its decision to one that is in the minority, irrespective of whether the minority process has finalized. (Note that this removal does not impact transitions in I and the invariant of the original program, since there is no corresponding state in I .)
While we omit the detailed analysis of different iterations of this loop, we note that the transitions of the graceful program for process i in states outside I are as shown in Fig. 6 . (Recall that the transitions for process i inside I are the same as that of the original program.):
Adding fault-tolerance to program with graceful degradation
In this section, we present the second step in the two-step approach, namely, adding fault-tolerance to the graceful program. Hence, we first introduce the notion of faults. Then, in Problem Statement VIII.2, we formalize the requirements for adding fault-tolerant graceful-degradation. Subsequently, we continue with the two case studies discussed in Sect. 5 by utilizing the original and graceful program to obtain a fault-tolerant graceful-degradation program. For brevity, we only focus on one of the levels of tolerance, namely masking tolerance.
The faults, say f , that a program is subject to is represented by a set of transitions. Specifically, given a program p = S p , δ p , faults f are a subset of S p × S p . We use p[] f to denote the transitions obtained by taking the union of p and f .
Masking fault-tolerance One can consider different levels of tolerance, namely failsafe, nonmasking and masking, to a given fault based on whether the program satisfies safety and/or liveness in the presence of faults. Masking faulttolerant program ensures that in the absence of faults, it satisfies its specification (including both safety and liveness). Moreover, in the absence of faults, it remains inside its invariant. In the presence of faults, it may be perturbed to a state outside its invariant. Let T be the boundary up to which the program can be perturbed due to faults and subsequent program actions. A masking fault-tolerant program ensures that starting from any state in T , it recovers to its invariant. Thus, it ensures that after faults occur, the program recovers to states from where both safety and liveness are satisfied. Additionally, during this recovery, it satisfies the safety specification.
Based on this intuition, we formally define a program, say p, is masking f -tolerant to spec (= S f , Lv ) from I iff the following conditions hold:
(1) p satisfies spec from I . Now we consider the problem of adding fault-tolerance to the graceful program. Intuitively, the resulting fault-tolerant program, say p f , is required to satisfy the original (stronger) specification in the absence of faults. However, when the program is perturbed by faults, the program is guaranteed to recover to states from where it satisfies the weaker specification. We formally identify the problem in Problem Statement VIII.2, as follows.
Problem Statement VIII.2: Addition of Fault-Tolerant Graceful-Degradation
Given p, spec, I , such that p satisfies spec from I ; p g , spec r , I g , such that p g satisfies spec r from I g ; I ⊆ I g , p |I ⊆ p g |I , f . Does there exist I f , I g f and p f such that
: p f satisfies spec from I f , B4: p f is masking f -tolerant for spec r from I g f .
As one can imagine, it should be possible to reuse existing algorithms for adding fault-tolerance to add fault-tolerant graceful degradation. However, one needs to ensure that during such reuse, the synthesized program satisfies the weaker specification in the presence of faults. By contrast, (assuming that satisfying the stronger specification were not feasible), the existing algorithm for adding fault-tolerance will declare failure to add fault-tolerance. There are several algorithms [1,5,13] for adding fault-tolerance in the literature. In this section, we plan to utilize them as a black box, i.e., we only rely on the assumption that they satisfy the problem of adding fault-tolerance (repeated from [5] ).
Problem Statement VIII.3: Addition of Fault-Tolerance
Given p, spec, I , f such that p satisfies spec from I ; Does there exist I f , and p f such that
In order to describe the fault-tolerant program subject to the constraints in Problem Statement VIII.2, we can utilize any of the algorithms [1, 5, 13] . We use the name Add_masking to describe such a generic algorithm. Since our reuse is black-box in nature, we only rely on the proof (from [1,5,13]) that it satisfies Problem VIII.3. However, for the convenience of the reader, we briefly describe the key steps of these algorithms. Given the fault-intolerant program, a set of fault transitions, the invariant and specification, Add_masking first ensures all the reachable states by p[] f satisfy safety specification and then excludes the computation that starts outside the invariant and cannot possibly reach a state in the invariant. In addition, Add_masking also resolves deadlock states and removes computations that reach the deadlock states if it is impossible to add recovery.
The algorithm for adding fault-tolerant graceful degradation is as shown in Algorithm 3. First, it invokes Add_masking (Line 4) that satisfies the constraints of Problem VIII.3. The input to Add_masking consists of the graceful program p g , fault transition f , invariant of the graceful program I g , and weaker specification spec r . Add_masking returns p and I such that constraints of Problem VIII.3 are satisfied. Note that p satisfies the weaker specification in the absence of faults. Hence, we consider the computations of p on I ∩ I (Line 5) by computing I ∩ I and p |(I ∩ I ), i.e., a program whose transitions are a subset of the transitions of p and p . Since the transitions of this program are a subset of that of p, it satisfies the stronger specification, spec, as long as it does not deadlock in any state in I ∩ I . If there are deadlock states, those are removed (Loop 6-11) and the process is repeated (Loop 2-12 ). We now prove the correctness of Algorithm 3. Proof We need to show that the two loops eventually terminate. We prove this by showing the existence of a least fixpoint for both loops. 
Algorithm 3 Adding Fault-tolerance to Graceful Program
Lemma 3 (Correctness of Algorithm 3) Let the input to Algorithm 3 be: -fault-intolerant program p, -invariant I , -spec (original specification), -graceful program p g , -spec r (relaxed specification), -I g (graceful invariant), and -fault f
Lemma 4 Let the input to Algorithm
Theorem 3 Let the input to Algorithm 3 be: (i) faultintolerant program p, (ii) invariant I , (iii) spec (original specification), (iv) graceful program p g , (v) spec r (relaxed specification), (vi) I g (graceful invariant), and (vii) fault f Then, Algorithm 3 solves Problem VIII.2 in polynomial time.
Proof It follows from Lemmas 3 and 4, p f | I f ⊆ p g | I g f (since I f ⊆ I g f and p f is obtained by removing transitions from p g ) and p f | I g f ⊆ p g | I g f (as p f is smaller than p g ).
Case study (continued): fault-tolerant printer system
In this section, we continue with the printer system from Sect. 5. We consider the fault that dequeues the next task before the current task is printed. Specifically, the fault action is represented as follows:
Next, we use this fault action along with the original and graceful program from Sect. 5 to generate the fault-tolerant graceful degradation program: Observe that in this case, the invariant of the graceful program is closed in the fault actions. Hence, Add_masking can trivially satisfy the fault-tolerance requirement as no recovery action is needed. And, the actions of the fault-tolerant graceful-degradation program are the same as those of the graceful program.
Case study (continued): resource constraint problem
In this section, we extend the cellular network case study from Sect. 5 to make it fault-tolerant. One type of fault that occurs often is channel loss. The fault action is:
As can be observed, the invariant of the graceful program is closed in the fault action, meaning that no further action needs to be added to the graceful program, i.e., the graceful program can tolerate channel losses.
Case study (continued): fault-tolerant byzantine agreement
As discussed earlier, the fault action relevant for this step is the one that makes the general process byzantine. We represent this fault by two actions. First action causes the general to be byzantine and the second allows it to change its decision.
Based on the constraints of Problem VIII.2, in the context of byzantine agreement, the problem of adding faulttolerant graceful-degradation will result in a program that has the following properties: In the absence of faults, i.e., when the general is not byzantine, it will guarantee that weak validity, weak agreement and Lv are satisfied. Moreover, in the presence of faults, i.e., when the general is byzantine, weak agreement will be satisfied and eventually the program will recover to a state where both weak agreement and Lv would be satisfied. Observe that taken together, this ensures that the final program guarantees that if the general is not byzantine then all non-generals finalize with a decision that is the same as that of the general. And, if the general is byzantine, all non-byzantine non-generals finalize with identical decision. In other words, the faulttolerant graceful degradation program satisfies the typical requirements for byzantine agreement [14] .
The graceful program from Sect. 7 did not entirely handle the read restrictions. Hence, the input program would remove certain transitions that potentially violate the read restrictions. Observe that the first action (where process i changes from ⊥ to d.g) exists in I as well as outside I . Hence, knowledge of b.g is not needed when executing this action. Hence, the action corresponding to the group containing second action must be removed. Likewise, in the third action, i can change its value to either 0 or 1 only if both d. j and d.k are different from the general. The fourth action remains as is. Regarding the fifth action, we observe that if a fault occurs in a state reached after executing that action then the corresponding state, where d.g = d.i and f .i = 1, is outside I g . Since recovery is not possible from this state, this transition would be removed during addition of fault-tolerance. Finally, the sixth action remains as is. Thus, the actions of the faulttolerant program are as shown in Fig. 7 . And as discussed above, it satisfies the requirements of [14] . The program is also correct even if the third modified action is removed. It is generated by our program to provide maximal choice to the designer.
Addition of fault-tolerant multi-graceful degradation
The problem of graceful degradation focuses on obtaining a program that satisfies a weakened specification. This concept can be generalized to a hierarchy of specifications, one weaker than the previous one. In this section, we generalize
Second action subsumed by the first one.
Third action modified as below
Fifth action removed
Fig. 7
Byzantine agreement: actions for fault-tolerant gracefuldegradation program our definitions and algorithms to such multi-graceful degradation.
Problem statement
A multi-graceful degradation program satisfies its original specification when no fault has occurred. However, if faults occur then depending upon their severity, it satisfies a weaker specification. To characterize the severity of faults, a multigraceful degradation program identifies a set of faults, say
, f j+1 can perturb the program at least as much as f j does. Hence, we say that f j+1 is more severe than f j . In the presence of increasingly severe faults, multi-graceful degradation program provides successively weaker guarantees. Hence, it identifies a set of specifications spec r 0 (= spec, the original specification), spec r 1 , spec r 2 , . . . , spec r n such that ∀ j : 0 ≤ j < n : spec r j+1 is weaker than spec r j . Moreover, in the presence of increasingly severe faults, the program may not recover to its original behavior. Hence, it identifies a set of state predicates I 1 , I 2 , . . . I n to which it recovers after the recovery is complete. For each class of faults, a fault-tolerant multi-graceful degradation program provides the desired level -masking, failsafe or nonmaskingof tolerance. However, in this section, we consider masking fault-tolerance alone. Generalization to other types of faulttolerance is straightforward.
To add multi-graceful degradation to a given program p that satisfies its specification, say spec from invariant, say I , we need to construct a program p f with invariant I f such that p f satisfies spec from I f without using any new behaviors other than those used by p. However, if faults occur then it needs to provide appropriate level of tolerance to them as well as recover to states from where it satisfies the corresponding weaker specification. Thus, the problem statement is as follows:
where ∀ j : 0 ≤ j < n : spec r j+1 is weaker than spec r j Generate a multi-graceful fault-tolerant program p f and invariant I f such that
p f satisfies spec from I f 3: p f is masking f i -tolerant to spec r i from I i .
Algorithm for adding fault-tolerant multi-graceful degradation
In this section, we introduce the algorithm for adding multigraceful degradation in Algorithm 4. Algorithm 4 takes as input the set of increasingly severe faults and correspondingly weaker specifications. It also takes in as inputs state predicates S a 1 , S a 2 , . . . , S a n . These state predicates capture constraints, if any, under which the corresponding graceful behavior is expected. By default, they could be set to S p − I , i.e., all states outside the invariant of the original program. Algorithm 4 considers the faults successively. For fault class f 1 , it generates a graceful program satisfying a relaxed specification spec r 1 (Line 3). This program preserves all original behaviors of p and adds new behaviors that satisfy spec r 1 . Observe that this can be achieved by Algorithm 1 presented earlier in the paper. After obtaining the graceful program that satisfies spec r 1 , we add fault tolerance to f 1 (Line 4). This algorithm adds masking tolerance to the input program. Similar to Algorithm 3, we use a generic algorithm Add_masking to achieve this. This algorithm can be instantiated to be an algorithm from [1, 5, 13] .
Finally, this whole process is repeated for each fault-class. Thus, the algorithm for adding multi-graceful degradation is as shown in Algorithm 4: Proof To show Algorithm 4 is sound, we first recall the properties of Algorithm 1. Let the input to Algorithm 1 be p, its invariant I , original specification spec and the weaker specification spec r ,. Let the output be the graceful program p g and its invariant I g . Then, we have:
Theorem 4 (Correctness of Algorithm 4) Let the input to
Now we use the above three properties to prove this theorem where we need to show that p f and I f satisfy conditions in Problem Statement IX.1.
I f ⊆ I follows from Line 14. p f |I f ⊆ p|I f follows from Line 4 since it does not add any new transition to p|I f . -p f satisfies spec from I f .
Note that after each iteration (Line 2 to Line 13), p satisfies the specification from invariant generated in previous steps. It follows from Line 3 that I is closed in p g i ; and from Line 4 that I is closed in p since Add_masking does not add any new transition in I g i as well as in I . In addition, from Line 6 to Line 11, no new transition is added and deadlock states are resolved. Hence I f is closed in p f . Moreover p f satisfies spec since I f ⊆ I . -p f is masking f i -tolerant to spec r i from I i . p obtained after each iteration (Line 2 to Line 13) satisfies spec r i follows the same proof above. And p f is masking f i -tolerant is ensured via Add_masking.
Theorem 5 Algorithm 4 is polynomial in the size of (|S p | * n)
where S p is the state space and n the is number of fault classes.
Proof The complexity of Algorithm 1 is polynomial in the size of (|S p |). If we utilize the Add_masking algorithm from [5] then its complexity is also polynomial in the size of (|S p |). Moreover, in Algorithm 4, the outer loop (from Line 2 to Line 13) executes at most n iterations and the inner loop (from Line 6 to Line 11) executes polynomial times in (|S p |).
Ohio coal research center ventilation system
In this section, we illustrate Algorithm 4 with a case study related to Ohio Coal Research Center (OCRC) ventilation system. The OCRC safety system [15] was designed to protect personnel and facilities by detecting the presence of explosive and/or toxic gas and either dealing with it, or by alerting lab personnel and emergency responders. Our goal in this paper is to illustrate how (a slightly abstracted version of) this system can be designed using Algorithm 4. In OCRC, the facility works with several gases that are potentially explosive/poisonous in large enough concentration. The first line of defense if these gases are released is ventilation, i.e., to evacuate any gas before it becomes a hazard. Ordinarily, ventilation is handled by the building's central air supply (see Fig. 8 ) and exhaust, augmented by an exhaust booster fan. If gas is detected (above a specified threshold), the lab needs to be isolated from the rest of the building by closing the exhaust vent cover and then turning off the booster, and turning on a local exhaust fan that evacuates air directly outside the building. Depending on the level of gas concentration, status lights in the lab will change from red to yellow or red, and a claxon alarm will sound. In addition, automated phone calls are placed to lab personnel and emails are sent.
The system needs to tolerate equipment faults. Sensors are generally duplicated so that failure of one sensor is tolerated, and relative accuracy can be compared. Hence, failure to detect the gas is not a concern. However, other parts of the system can fail. For example, if the central exhaust supply fails, a local supply fan needs to be turned on. Also, whenever feasible, isolation is desired so that the released gas does not enter the rest of the building. However, if the vent cover fails and does not close then it may be impossible.
Based on the analysis of these faults, in [15] , authors have identified four possible statuses: Safe, NotLocal, UnsafeLab and UnsafeCentral.
Status Safe corresponds to the case where there is ventilation, and the lab is isolated if necessary. Ventilation can be Central (central exhaust on, vent cover open, booster on) or Local (vent cover closed and local exhaust on); in both cases central and/or local supply are on. NotLocal corresponds to the case where there is ventilation but not isolation; this means central exhaust is being used. UnsafeLab corresponds to the case where the lab is isolated although ventilation is inadequate. UnsafeCentral corresponds to the case where the lab should be isolated but is not, and ventilation is inadequate. These form a total order from safest to most hazardous.
To illustrate graceful degradation, we focus on the key components of ventilation: central supply, central exhaust, vent cover, local supply and local exhaust. For simplicity, we ignore the exhaust booster. Specifically, if exhaust booster fails, we model it as a failure of the central exhaust system. Central supply and exhaust are not controllable but other components are. Controllable components have an actuation status (open/closed, on/off) and controllability status (controllable or not). A component is declared uncontrollable if an attempt to actuate it fails, and it remains uncontrollable until an operator fixes it and declares it controllable. Controllability lets us know whether it can be actuated or whether we have to adapt to its present status.
Modeling ventilation system
Variables Based on the assumption made by system designers, either central supply or local supply is functioning and it is acceptable to use either one or both. Moreover, the choice of supply does not affect the status (Safe, NotLocal, etc.) of the system. Hence, we only model the central exhaust and local exhaust system. Hence, we introduce the variable cc (denoting whether central exhaust is available to use, i.e., it has not been turned off by building.) and variable lc (denoting whether local exhaust is available to use, i.e., whether it is controllable). We also introduce variable c (denoting whether the central exhaust system is being used by the lab) and variable l (denoting whether the local exhaust system is being used by the lab). Likewise, we introduce variables v and vc to denote status of vent cover and its controllability. Finally, the variable gas denotes whether hazardous gas exists at a sufficiently high concentration. Thus, the variables are as follows:
-gas : {0, 1}: Gas hazard detected (gas = 1) or not (gas = 0). Based on the above modeling, we identify certain structural constraints. These constraints describe limitations in terms of transitions that a revised program can include. For example, if the central exhaust is not controllable then the system cannot use it by setting c = 1. Observe that this structural constraint can be modeled as a set of transitions that the program cannot include. Hence, during the synthesis algorithm, we model it as (an additional) safety specification that has to be satisfied by the revised program. The set of (bad) transitions identifying the structural constraints are given by the following set of transitions.
In addition, the program cannot reach certain states in which central/local exhaust is uncontrollable (cc = 0, lc = 0) while it is turned on (c = 1, l = 1). Thus We use gas, vc, cc, lc|v, c, l to Specification There are two major requirements considered critical in the system design. First of all, when hazardous gas is detected, the lab should be isolated from the building (denoted as R iso ) to prevent gas leak from the lab to the rest of the building. Second, the poisonous gas must be exhausted from lab (denoted as R exh ) to outside air. These requirements are captured by R iso and R exh , where -R iso = gas ⇒ ¬v, gas isolated.
R exh is considered much more important than R iso since gases like hydrogen and carbon monoxide can explode. Hence, we can consider three requirements that are used in describing the graceful behavior.
-S f 1 = R iso ∧ R exh , where S f 1 is the ideal requirement that should be satisfied whenever possible. In this state, any leaked gas is exhausted while isolating the rest of building from gas. This corresponds to status Safe described at the beginning of this section. -S f 2 = R exh , where S f 2 is desirable when S f 1 cannot be met, i.e., if isolation cannot occur then exhaust must be provided. This corresponds to the status NotLocal described at the beginning of this section. -S f 3 = R iso ∨ R exh , where S f 3 specifies that at least one of the two requirements should be met. This corresponds to the status UnsafeLab described at the beginning of this section.
Remark For brevity of presentation, we do not model UnsafeCentral. Modeling UnsafeCentral will require three different levels of graceful degradation. However, our algorithm can be easily applied in deriving this third level of graceful degradation.
Original program
In the ideal scenario, there is no gas leak and at least one of the exhaust systems is functioning correctly. Moreover, since no gas is leaked, the vent is always open. For efficiency reasons, whenever possible, the program chooses the central exhaust. But it switches to the local exhaust if needed. Thus, the program consists of three actions. Specifically, the first action turns on the central exhaust and turns off the local exhaust when both are available. If only one of the exhaust is available, the last two actions utilize the corresponding 
Application of multi-graceful degradation in OCRC
In this section, we illustrate Algorithm 4 in the context of OCRC. First, we discuss the faults in different severity and the expected requirements in the presence of these faults. Then, specify corresponding relaxed specifications. In particular, we split the whole synthesis progress into four parts following Algorithm 4. In the end, we show the resulting program and compare it with the original OCRC system design.
Faults
Before adding graceful degradation to the program in Table 1 , we identify the faults that may require one to provide a weaker specification. We consider four possible faults that affect the system. Of these, the first fault, f 1 , corresponds to the case where a gas leak occurs. The next two faults, f 2 and f 3 , cause the central and the local exhaust to become uncontrollable. When the exhaust becomes unavailable/uncontrollable, the system receives a notification upon which the system must turn the corresponding exhaust to off. Moreover, it cannot turn that exhaust on again (except under manual intervention). Note that the assumption in this system is that both the local and the central exhaust do not become uncontrollable. This is captured in the modeling of fault actions f 2 and f 3 . Finally, the last fault action, f 4 , causes the vent cover to be uncontrollable. This is a stuck-at fault that causes the vent to remain in its current position. Its status cannot be changed by the program. These faults are as shown in Table 2 .
Requirements in the presence of faults
In this system, the first graceful program, say p g f t 1 , is designed for the case where faults f 1 and f 2 occur. Observe that in the presence of f 1 and f 2 , local exhaust and vent cover are still controllable. Hence, we can eventually ensure both R iso and R exh . Note that in the presence of f 1 and f 2 , system may reach states that violate S f 1 if f 1 occurs while the central exhaust is being used. But all such states are still in S f 2 . Hence, the desired graceful behavior in this context is one that satisfies the safety specification S f 2 and liveness specification Lv 2 :=true S f 1 . The second graceful program, say p g f t 2 , is designed for the case where all four faults can happen. If the local exhaust is uncontrollable then it would be impossible to satisfy S f 1 when a gas leak occurs. Likewise, if the vent cover cannot be closed, it would be impossible to satisfy S f 1 . Hence, if the system is exposed to all four faults, the system may reach states that violate S f 2 . However, all such states still satisfy S f 3 . Hence, the desired graceful behavior in this context is one that satisfies the safety specification S f 3 and liveness specification Lv 2 :=true S f 2 . Thus, the system design requires us to consider two classes of faults. The first class includes actions f 1 and f 2 . These faults are combined into one class since requirements in their presence are the same. And, the second class includes f 1 , f 2 , f 3 and f 4 .
Application of Algorithm 4
First, we identify the inputs for Algorithm 4.
-The fault-intolerant program p is same as that shown in Table 1 Recall that Algorithm 4 utilizes a multi-step approach where in each step, one class of faults is considered. The Algorithm 4 invokes Algorithm 1 on Line 3. This subroutine expands the behavior of the original program to add new behaviors that only satisfy the weaker specification. Subsequently, it utilizes this program to add fault-tolerance in Line 4. Thus, for ease of understanding, we partition the application of Algorithm 4 into four parts, given below: To generate p g 1 (on Line 3 of Algorithm 4), we invoke procedure Gen_grace f ul. Based on the inputs to Algorithm 4, the inputs to the algorithm are as follows.
-S a : As mentioned, S a1 = { 1, * , * , * | * , * , * }.
-p: In the first iteration (2-13), the program transitions for gen_grace f ul is the fault-intolerant program p. -I : Same as the invariant identified for fault-intolerant program. -spec r 1 : The relaxed specification is a pair of safety specification and liveness specification.
-Relaxed Safety: We specify safety specification as the set of bad states and bad transitions. First of all, we require that program always satisfies S f 2 , thus states in ¬S f 2 are not allowed. In addition, the relaxed safety specification should always contain structural constraints S f bs and S f bt . -Relaxed Liveness: We require program ensure both exhaustion and isolation eventually, i.e. reach a state satisfying S f 1 .
Hence spec r 1 := (¬S f 2 ∪ S f bs , S f bt ), true S f 1 .
First on Line 1, we identify all the states in S a satisfying S f r bs . These states are denoted as I :
includes all states in I and I . On Line 3, we obtain the set of transitions satisfying the safety specification. In particular, we show all the transitions in Fig. 9 (including solid and dashed arrow). Note that on Line 3, each state in I is added with a self-loop transition. Now we discuss the synthesis by loop (from Line 4 to Line 13) in different iterations.
-Iteration #1: By construction I only includes states where no hazardous gas is present and I only includes states where hazardous gas is present. The program cannot write the variable gas. Hence no transition from I to I is added on Line 7. There is no deadlock state identified in this iteration on Line 8. To realize the effect of Line 11, we first assign the rank (using function rank) over each state. According to Lv, states in S f 1 are assigned rank 0. Since both states 1, 1, 1, 1|1, 1, 1 and 1, 1, 1, 1|1, 0, 1 reach Therefore the remaining transitions (and states) together with those in p (and in I ) are returned as p g 1 (and I g 1 ). We show transitions of p g 1 (except those shown in Table 1) To add fault-tolerance, we use procedure Add_masking as a black box. Thus to illustrate the result of adding faulttolerance, we first consider how the program can be perturbed by faults, that is set of reachable states by p g 1 in the presence of f , where f = f 1 ∪ f 2 ; then show that starting from all these reachable states there are transitions provided by either original program p or graceful program p g 1 .
In the absence of faults, if only f 1 occurs, the system reaches one of the states in 1, 1, 1, 1| * , * , * . Note that all these states are generated in p g 1 and have outgoing transition, thus f 1 is tolerated. In the absence of faults, if only f 2 occurs, following transitions in p, system switches to local exhaust, thus f 2 is tolerated. If original program perturbed by f 1 and f 2 together, the only state can be perturbed to is 1, 1, 0, 1|1, 0, 1 which is generated in p g 1 and has an outgoing transition. Thus, there is no changes on Line 4 in Algorithm 4. Part 3: Generation of graceful program p g 2 .
In this case, we add fault-tolerance to the program generated in Part 2. The inputs of program and invariant are selected from the first iteration. Faults consist of all four faults in Table 2 and the specification in the presence of faults is as specified in Sect. 10.2.2.
We do not elaborate the effect of Algorithm 1 again on p g 2 . Instead, we show set of newly discovered transitions and states in p g 2 (not including those in p g 1 ) in Table 3 . Part 4: Adding fault-tolerance to p g 2 .
There are no new transitions added by Add_masking, and p g f t 2 is same as p g 2 .
Extension to deal with UnsafeCentral
To finalize the synthesis, we also consider the status of UnsafeCentral. In this case, neither isolation nor exhaust may be satisfied, at least temporarily. Hence, the relaxed requirement does not include any safety specification. However, it includes a liveness specification, namely, true S f 3 . Although we do not present the application of Algorithm 4, we can easily obtain the corresponding program by considering only another class of faults and applying Algorithm 4 in a third iteration.
The state where S f 3 is violated is reached due to faults such as transients. It could also be reached if both exhaust systems fail temporarily. Algorithm 4 already handles this scenario as well. Specifically, for this case, we need to model fault f 5 as a transient fault that requires the liveness specification true S f 3 . If we add this as the third fault class and apply Algorithm 4, the resulting program is same as the ventilation system (i.e., the system except alarms, status lights etc) of OCRC.
Related work
The work in this paper is closely related to that of controller synthesis, game theory and automated addition of fault-tolerance. Controller synthesis considers the following problem: Given two languages U (plant) and D (desired system), identify a third language C (controller), such that U ∩ D ⊆ C [16] . Thus, the goal is to begin with the plant and add controller to obtain the desired system. The idea of transforming a fault-intolerant system into a fault-tolerant system using controller synthesis is used in [17] . Also in [18] , Girault and Rutten demonstrate the application of discrete controller synthesis in automated addition of fault-tolerance in the context of untimed systems. Our work in this paper differs from this work in that we are trying to relax the specification of the given system whereas they are trying to strengthen it. In the context of game theoretical approach for model revision, a program is automatically fixed as a game [19, 20] . The game is played on the model of two players [21] , i.e., program and environment. A program is considered to win the game if the specification is always satisfied no matter how the environment interacts with the program. Game theoretic methods are usually based on the theory of tree automata [22] .
Model repair for probabilistic system [3] is to revise a probabilistic system M such that the new system M satisfies a probabilistic temporal logic formula. M differs from M only in the transition flows of controllable states. Our work is orthogonal to that in [3] in that this work can be extended in the context of dealing with probabilities and their work can be extended to deal with addition of graceful degradation. Algorithms for automatic addition of fault-tolerance [1, 5] add fault-tolerance concerns to existing untimed or real-time programs in the presence of faults, and guarantee the addition of no new behaviors to the original program in the absence of faults. In the context of this paper, we utilize the synthesis algorithm for adding fault-tolerance. Our work builds on this work by enabling repair in scenarios where the previous work fails to perform repair or has a much higher overhead.
Discussion and summary
Discussion
Order of Operations in Different Phases. In our approach, we first designed a program that satisfied degraded specification. Subsequently, we added fault-tolerance to the resulting program. A natural question, thus, is whether it would be possible to add fault-tolerance as the first step. We argue that this is not possible. In particular, the main reason for using the approach in this paper is for cases where it is impossible for the fault-tolerant program to recover to states from where the original specification is satisfied.
Comparison with algorithms for adding safety, liveness or fault-tolerance. Existing work [5, 13, 23] focuses on adding properties to an existing program. Since the goal of this work is to construct a program that preserves the existing specification (in the absence of faults) and to satisfy the newly desired property, they prohibit transitions to be added in the absence of faults. This is due to the fact that adding transitions creates new program behaviors that may not satisfy the original (universal) specification. However, these approaches permit removal of transitions, as removal of transitions preserves existing universal specification as long as it does not create deadlocks. Our solution in Algorithm 1 is explicitly designed to add such transitions so that the new program satisfies a relaxed specification. For this reason, the algorithms in this paper are more general than that in [5, 13, 23] . Specifically, the algorithm in this paper is applicable even if it is impossible to recover the system to states from where the original specification is satisfied. By contrast, the algorithms in [5, 13, 23] will declare failure in these cases.
Scalability of approach. State space explosion is generally unavoidable in the area of program verification or synthesis. Even though the addition of fault tolerance (FT) is NP-complete in the size of the state space, it has been shown to be feasible to add FT to programs of moderate size [24] , up to programs with state space of 10 100 [25] . However, the approach may not directly scale to C++ programs of 1000s of lines of code. One possible way to circumvent this is through model extraction. In [26] , we have extracted the necessary state transition model from a UML model, apply fault tolerance transformation to it and convert it back (with some heuristics) to a UML model. In [27] , the authors have shown how an UPPAAL model can be extracted from a SystemC model (an extension of C). We have shown how FT can be added to these models [28] and how it can be sliced to find subset of the model relevant to the property at hand. In this context, automated reverse transformation is not yet available.
Transformation failure. Our algorithm involves 2 steps: (i) Addition of graceful behavior and (ii) addition of faulttolerance. Technically, the first step cannot fail. It can simply return the original program, i.e., it may not add any new behaviors. This may, however, cause the second step to fail. Adding fault-tolerance fails for two reasons: (1) it is impossible to satisfy the property or (2) heuristics used for adding fault-tolerance fails. For high atomicity programs-where a process can read all the variables, the algorithms for adding fault-tolerance are sound and complete, i.e., they declare failure only if a solution is not feasible. For distributed programs, the problem of adding fault-tolerance is NP-complete. Hence, heuristic based approaches have been developed for adding fault-tolerance in distributed systems.
Implication to concrete programs. Our work focuses on event based programs where each process consists of several event processing modules that responds to events (that may correspond to external events or internal events indicating that certain predicate is true). In this case, adding behaviors corresponds to adding new modules for dealing with newer predicates. By contrast, removing behaviors corresponds to restricting ore removing existing event response modules.
An alternate approach is to utilize ideas such as recovery blocks [29] . Specifically, in this approach, at certain instances of the program, acceptance conditions are checked. If they are violated, alternate code is executed to recover from the resulting faults/errors. New behaviors can be added by adding such recovery blocks. Also, in [30] , authors present an approach to utilize concurrent atomic actions (that are the basis of our model) instead of recovery blocks.
Interference among properties. In our case study on multigraceful degradation, we assumed that the specifications were in a strict order, with the original specification being strongest, the next one weaker and so on. This allowed us to handle the stepwise addition where we consider one specification at a time. It is possible to consider a version where you have incompatible weaker specifications. For example, one specification could be to satisfy requirement 1 alone but not necessarily requirement 2. Another specification could be to satisfy requirement 2 but not necessarily requirement 1. We believe that designing graceful degradation in this manner is expected to be more difficult. We anticipate it being NPcomplete based on a result in [31] . In this work, authors have considered adding failsafe and nonmasking fault-tolerance. They are similar to incompatible requirements. We anticipate that such scenarios are generally rare; in most cases, requirements can be characterized in terms of their priority and the desired graceful behaviors require that highest priority requirements should be satisfied. Hence, the graceful behaviors naturally fall into (1) drop 1 requirement with lowest priority, (2) drop 2 requirements with lowest priority and so on.
Conclusion
Existing approaches for automated addition of fault-tolerance have focused on the following problem: Given a faultintolerant program p, construct a fault-tolerant program p such that p behaves like pafter recovery from faults. It follows that after recovery is complete, p satisfies the original specification of p. However, as discussed in the paper, there are several instances where it is impossible (or undesirable) to recover the system to states from where the original specification is satisfied. Hence, we focused on the problem of graceful fault-tolerance, where the goal is to construct a program p such that (1) in the absence of faults p behaves like p, (2) p provides desired fault-tolerance, and (3) after recovery is complete, p exhibits graceful behavior where it satisfies the given weaker specification.
We presented a two-phase approach for designing graceful fault-tolerance: In the first phase, we transformed the input fault-intolerant program p into a graceful program p g that includes all behaviors of p as well as new behaviors that satisfy the desired weaker specification. In the second phase, we used both p and p g to obtain a fault-tolerant program p that behaves like p in the absence of faults and recovers to behaviors provided by p g after the faults stop.
To solve this problem, we have first formalized the problem of adding graceful degradation to a program and have then provided an algorithm that transforms a given faultintolerant program into a gracefully degrading program. We presented two solutions, one for concurrent programs and another for distributed programs where each process can read or write only a subset of program variables. For the second phase, we have formulated the problem of addition of fault-tolerance where one begins with two (or possibly more) programs that satisfy successively weaker specifications.
We have then demonstrated the applicability of our algorithms through three case studies: (i) a printer system [4] , (ii) cellular networks [11] and (iii) Byzantine agreement. Of these, if we used the first two case studies with existing approaches [23] then they will declare failure since there does not exist a fault-tolerant program that satisfies the original specification. And, for the third case study, a significantly more complex input is required to permit addition of faulttolerance.
We have then extended the notion of graceful degradation to that of multi-graceful degradation whereby a program can satisfy some weaker specification based on the severity of the fault type being present. Similarly, we have first formalised the problem and provided a polynomial-time algorithm that automates the addition of multi-graceful degradation. We have shown the applicability of the algorithm on a non-trivial case study, namely the OCRC system.
Our approach for designing graceful programs also opens up new research directions in the area of program repair, where the goal is to add a desired property (safety, liveness, fault-tolerance, etc.) to a given program. However, these approaches fail if the newly desired property is incompatible (e.g., adding priorities to programs that assume equal fairness) with an existing property of the program.
For example, consider the case where we have a program that provides fair mutual exclusion access to processes P1 and P2. Suppose we want to add the property that requires that P1 has higher priority than P2. Since the new requirement is incompatible with existing program prop-erties, existing approaches that add a new property while preserving existing universal properties fails. In these cases, our first phase can be used to remove 'fairness' from the given program so that the priority requirement can be added. Thus, novel algorithms to add new properties to an existing program after removing the offending property are required.
